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ACADEMIC PERSPECTIVES ON SALT
On Yang’s Proposed Federal Tax 
On Subnational Tax Incentives
by David Gamage and Darien Shanske
Democratic presidential candidate Andrew 
Yang recently announced a new proposal to — 
in his campaign’s words — “end bidding wars 
for corporate relocation.”
Even though Yang probably will not win the 
primary, we think that his proposal is still worth 
taking seriously, in part because we have heard 
similar proposals floated by other politicians 
over the last couple of years, including by 
current members of Congress. We thus expect to 
see similar proposals in the future, regardless of 
what happens with Yang’s candidacy.
To begin with, the text of Yang’s released 
proposal is short, so it is worth quoting in full:1
The recent circus surrounding Amazon’s 
HQ2 project should highlight how 
damaging the practice of allowing 
localities to “bid” for investment from 
corporations can be to our country, and 
how important it is for us to find a 
solution to this problem.
You can’t blame the corporation for 
trying to save money, and you can’t 
blame the localities for trying to attract 
investment and new jobs. Because no one 
has an incentive to stop this practice, it 
continues unabated.
However, it amounts to up to $90 billion 
a year of tax breaks and cash grants. 
Since states and other localities can’t run 
a deficit or print money, these subsidies 
amount to money that could otherwise 
go to school, road repair, and other 
important functions. These incentives 
are meant to steal jobs and investment from 
other states, not from offshoring or to 
entice businesses to expand when they 
otherwise wouldn’t.
There’s also evidence that corporations 
start with an idea of where they want to 
move and then use a public bidding war 
to get tax breaks from those locations. 
Considering Amazon’s business, D.C. 
and N.Y. were likely locations for HQ2 
even before they received 238 proposals 
from cities across the country.
David Gamage is a professor of law at 
Indiana University’s Maurer School of Law, 
and Darien Shanske is a professor at the 
University of California, Davis, School of Law 
(King Hall).
In this installment of Academic 
Perspectives on SALT, the authors discuss 
presidential candidate Andrew Yang’s 
proposal to tax subnational tax incentives for 
companies at a rate of 100 percent.
1
Friends of Andrew Yang, “End Bidding Wars for Corporate 
Relocation” (emphasis in original).
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This form of corporate welfare needs to 
stop, and only the federal government 
has an incentive to do so. We must end it 
by considering any financial benefit 
provided to a company to entice local 
investment, or relocation, to be special 
income that is taxed at 100 percent. 
General investment by a locality to be 
more business-friendly is fine, but no 
more bribing companies to do 
something they were already planning 
to do. The only ones who win are the 
companies.
We agree with the underlying premise of 
this proposal, namely that the states and 
localities are trapped in a race to the bottom and 
that the federal government can and should 
intervene. We have even argued that doing so 
would not only be in the national interest 
generally, but in the federal government’s 
interest as a financial matter because this kind 
of harmful competition ultimately costs the 
federal government and states and localities 
because of the phenomenon we call tax 
cannibalization.2
To review our earlier argument regarding 
tax cannibalization and tax incentives, the 
higher a state’s tax rate is on a shared base, say 
the corporate income tax base, the more 
revenue the federal government loses from 
taxpayers’ actions to avoid paying what is 
essentially a combined federal-state tax rate. 
Put more concretely, here is a simple and 
simplified example. Suppose a corporation 
engages in additional profit shifting out of the 
United States because of the additional 8.84 
percent corporate tax imposed by California. If 
the corporation shields $1 million in additional 
profits, California loses $88,400 of tax revenues. 
The federal fisc potentially loses $210,000 
because the rate at the federal level is 21 
percent.
Now consider what happens when states 
provide tax incentives against tax bases that 
they share with the federal government. To 
meet their revenue targets, states must levy 
higher tax rates than they would otherwise 
need absent these special tax incentives. Thus, 
in order to provide tax incentives to some 
taxpayers, states are likely cannibalizing the 
federal base more as to most taxpayers. So there 
is a financial reason for the federal government 
to care about state tax incentives.
We applaud Yang’s proposal because it 
shows considerable sophistication about state 
and local finance. Specifically, the proposal 
observes that, as a general matter, tax policy at 
the state and local level is more of a zero-sum 
game because of balanced budget constraints. 
As for our analysis of the substance of Yang’s 
proposal, we think that his proposed federal tax 
rate of 100 percent is too high.
Consider that a 100 percent tax rate is 
effectively an outright prohibition, which raises 
constitutional concerns.3 The federal government 
forbids the states from taxing many specific 
activities, typically involving interstate 
commerce. We think — and think most scholars 
think — that these prohibitions are on solid 
ground. By contrast, we think — and again think 
that most other scholars also think — that were 
the federal government to legislate a broad 
prohibition against states using a specific tax base, 
especially one already in use, like the corporate 
income tax, this would go too far. Our reasons for 
these conclusions are elaborated in prior writing.4
Applying this analysis to Yang’s proposal, a 
prohibition on targeted subsidies is clearly 
somewhere in the middle ground between these 
two extremes. That is, we think the 
constitutionality of Yang’s proposal for a 100 
percent tax rate is uncertain. On this point, note 
that our reading of NFIB v. Sebelius suggests that 
an otherwise unobjectionable exercise of one of 
the federal government’s powers (in the case of 
Yang’s proposal, the taxing power) can go too far 
and thus can become unconstitutional if it would 
overly undermine the fiscal operations of states.5 
We think a more modest tax rate as applied to 
2
David Gamage and Darien Shanske, “Tax Cannibalization and State 
Government Tax Incentive Programs,” State Tax Notes, Oct. 17, 2016, p. 
197.
3
For related discussion of the limits of the federal government’s 
power to restrict state governments’ exercise of tax and spending 
powers, see Gamage and Shanske, “The Federal Government’s Power to 





For more Tax Notes® State content, please visit www.taxnotes.com. 
©
 2019 Tax Analysts. All rights reserved. Tax Analysts does not claim
 copyright in any public dom
ain or third party content.
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3487106 
ACADEMIC PERSPECTIVES ON SALT
TAX NOTES STATE, OCTOBER 7, 2019  27
targeted subnational financial incentives would 
be on reasonably sound constitutional footing but 
that a 100 percent tax rate arguably goes too far.
To elaborate, imagine that a city is desperate 
to keep its local sports franchise and wants to 
offer financial incentives to do so. The Yang 
proposal would effectively forbid this at any 
price. Yet even agreeing that it is typically bad 
policy for cities to bribe sports teams in this 
manner, it is not clear whether the federal 
government either has — or should have — the 
power to completely ban subnational 
governments from engaging in this sort of 
behavior.
Under the federal constitutional framework, 
state and local governments are supposed to 
compete through policy experiments, to further 
their operating as laboratories of democracy. 
Industrial policy experiments should arguably 
be part of this. Moreover, it can be difficult to 
distinguish between subnational financial 
incentives that would be subject to Yang’s tax 
and the provision of public goods by 
subnational governments that are especially 
valued by some potentially mobile actors that 
the subnational governments wish to attract or 
retain.6 The higher the tax rate, the greater the 
pressure on this distinction and the more 
potential the tax will have to undermine 
subnational governments that seek to offer 
desirable public goods that just happen to be 
especially attractive to certain mobile actors.
If a 100 percent tax rate or a complete ban 
were the federal government’s only options to 
deter bad behavior by state and local 
governments of the sort that Yang is concerned 
with, then we would perhaps be less worried 
about these constitutional concerns. But a lower 
tax rate (say, perhaps, 50 percent) would serve 
policy goals far better than an outright ban 
created by a 100 percent tax rate.
To elaborate, from a national perspective, 
the primary concern underlying Yang’s 
proposal is that state and local tax incentives 
can generate a race to the bottom because each 
incentive imposes an externality on competing 
state and local governments that may then lose 
desired business and other activities unless 
they match the offered incentive. In this light, a 
sensible goal for federal government policy 
would be to correct this externality. As has long 
been understood, the best way to correct an 
externality is through a tax rate set to price the 
externality, not through a ban.7
Pricing these externalities correctly through 
a federal-level tax on subnational tax incentives 
potentially achieves two goals. First, the 
federal-level tax should deter state and local 
governments from providing tax incentives 
unless the subnational government has a strong 
interest in doing so. Second, regarding 
subnational tax incentives that are provided 
anyway, the fact that the parties are willing to 
pay the federal-level tax is a strong indicator 
that the project is worthwhile from a national 
perspective. And should there be such projects, 
the federal-level tax will generate a pot of 
money that can be used to mitigate the harm 
being done. For instance, these federal revenues 
could be dedicated to helping disadvantaged 
communities that cannot enter the competition 
to begin with.
We have commented on Yang’s proposal 
because it is a refreshing and smart engagement 
with state and local tax issues and one that we 
wish to encourage. The Yang proposal reflects 
the important fact that many — arguably most 
— core government services are provided at the 
state and local levels. Therefore, the fiscal 
health of these governments is of national 
importance and should be a matter for debate at 
the national level. There are numerous other 
ways that the federal government can improve 
state and local finance. We will conclude with a 
few ideas that we hope will also make it into the 
national political conversation:
• restore a reformed SALT deduction;8
• provide support so that states can improve 
their sales taxes and impose a VAT;9
6
We discuss this difficulty and possible ways of addressing it in a 
prior writing: Gamage and Shanske, supra note 2.
7
For explanation and discussion, see Gamage and Shanske, “Tax 
Cannibalization and Fiscal Federalism in the United States,” 111(2) Nw. 
U. L. Rev. 295, 356-61 (2017).
8
Gamage and Shanske, “The Future of SALT: A Broader Picture,” 
State Tax Notes, June 25, 2018, p. 1275.
9
Gamage and Shanske, “Tax Cannibalization and Fiscal Federalism 
in the United States,” supra note 7, at 364-67.
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• revive the estate tax credit;10
• repeal Public Law 86-272;11
• support state rainy day funds;12 and
• resurrect the Advisory Committee on 
Intergovernmental Relations so that there is 
a mechanism by which the federal 
government can learn what is really 
happening at the state and local levels.13
10
See Jeffrey A. Cooper, “Interstate Competition and State Death 
Taxes: A Modern Crisis in Historical Perspective,” 33(4) Pepp. L. Rev. 835 
(2006).
11
Shanske, “State Tax Administrators: Please Do Your Part in Sending 
P.L. 86-272 Off Into the Sunset,” Medium, July 5, 2019.
12
Brian D. Galle and Kirk J. Stark, “Beyond Bailouts: Federal Tools for 
Preventing State Budget Crises,” 87(2) Indiana L. J. 599 (2012).
13
Bruce D. McDowell, “Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental 
Relations in 1996: The End of an Era,” 27(2) Publius: J. Federalism 111, 113-
14 (1997).
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